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Created by Shaunak Ghosh
Map OpenClaw’s trust boundaries, then trace how indirect prompt injection turns untrusted email/web content into tool actions. You’ll identify sandbox bypass and host-equivalent execution paths, apply deny lists and elevated approvals, and close the loop by running OpenClaw’s security audit to catch drift before attackers do.
4 modules • Each builds on the previous one
Map where OpenClaw receives untrusted content, where the model runs, and where tools execute across the gateway host, sandbox containers, and paired nodes. Use this map to classify which capabilities must be treated as operator-level authority versus safe read-only behavior.
Analyze how a malicious email or webpage can smuggle instructions that override the agent’s goals and trigger tool calls. Focus on why “trusted sender” controls don’t help when the agent reads attacker-controlled content through browsing, fetch, attachments, or pasted text.
Identify the specific configurations and runtime paths that make an agent act on the host even when you believe it is sandboxed, including main-session host execution, elevated exec, host-control options, and node-local execution defaults. Learn how to verify the effective execution environment and design for fail-closed behavior when isolation is missing.
Design a defense-in-depth posture so a hijacked agent cannot cause real damage using channel allowlists, tool deny lists, exec approvals, and constrained execution surfaces. Apply OpenClaw’s security audit and prompt-injection test workflows to catch policy drift and close gaps before attackers do.
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In-video quizzes and scaffolded content to maximize retention.